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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0).
ISSUES
1.

Was the trial court correct in ruling that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the

running of the applicable statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001?
2.

Do state or constitutional due process provisions require the county to give

public notice and to hold a public hearing before selling surplus public property to Rulon
Jones?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The proper standard of review was correctly stated by the trial court. Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In reviewing summary judgment, this Court gives no deference to the trial court
and reviews its ruling for correctness. See Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake
County, 913 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1995). In this case the parties agreed that there were no
material factual disputes that precluded the court from interpreting the law.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(2)(a)
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with
the district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.
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Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242
(1) The county may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, or otherwise
acquire and dispose of any real or personal property or any interest in such
property that it determines to be in the public interest.
(2) Any property interest acquired by the county shall be held in the name of
the county unless specifically otherwise provided by law.
(3) The county legislative body shall provide by ordinance, resolution, rule, or
regulation for the manner in which property shall be acquired, managed, and
disposed of.
Weber County Ordinance § 6-1142(B)
B. Real property may be disposed of by public auction, by listing with a
licensed realtor, by negotiation, by trade, by sealed bid, or otherwise as
disposition shall be approved by the County Commissioners prior to the
commencement of negotiations or other means of disposition. The County
Commissioners may refuse any or all offers or bids.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to Rule 24(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mr. Jones will refer to the
parties as Plaintiffs, Weber County and Rulon Jones in this brief. Mr. Jones supports the
statement of the case made by Weber County and will not repeat it here. The statement of
the case included the nature of the case, course of proceedings, and statement of facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(2)(a) contains the 30-day statute of limitation provision
that applies in this case. The decision made by the Weber County Commission to sell
surplus property to Rulon Jones was made under the provisions of the County Land Use and
Management Act. Weber County followed the statutory provision for sale of surplus
property and the coimty's own ordinance for sale of surplus property. Under the law, the

notice and hearing requirements advocated by the Plaintiffs were not applicable to this case.
The sale of surplus property did not trigger an amendment to the Ogden Valley General Plan.
The Ogden Valley General Plan was enacted under state law and gives the county
discretion for the use and management of land within the Ogden Valley, both public and
private land. The plan does not specify public and private ownership of land. It speaks of
uses; ol i lie land

t\ sale ul publa bud does not automatically tnggt'i an j men drum! to a

general plan because the purpose of the plan is to signify uses. This property was not
dedicated to a public use, so notice and hearing requirements were not applicable.
The issue ol: whether all sales of public property shou Id requ ire the notice and hea ring
provisions advocated by Plaintiffs is one of public policy. It is a decision for the Legislature
to make because the current law does not require notice and hearing for the sale of surplus
property when there is tu.) necessary amendment to the general plan

\ change in ownership

of property absent a change of use does not require an amendment to the plan unless the plan
specifically requires a hearing for a change of ownership, which is not the case in Weber
Count)

File property at issue here is still used for recreational property so there is no

change in use.
The issue of the right of way is moot. Weber County and Rulon Jones have admitted
the right of way remains a public right of way.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE COUNTY'S SALE OF SURPLUS PROPERTY IS
AUTHORIZED UNDER STATE STATUTE AND COUNTY
ORDINANCE. SALE OF SURPLUS PROPERTY DOES NOT
REQUIRE NOTICE AND A PUBLIC HEARING, ESPECIALLY WHEN
IT DOES NOT TRIGGER AN AMENDMENT TO THE GENERAL
PLAN.
Weber County adopted the Ogden Valley General Plan by resolution on October 2,
1996. (R. 27-36). The plan was adopted under the authority of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-301
et seq. which states that "...each county shall prepare and adopt a comprehensive general
plan." Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-301. There was no map made to reflect the 1996 general
plan, because it is a general guideline for the Ogden Valley.1 The parties agree that the 160
acres sold to Mr. Jones by Weber County are included within the Ogden Valley General
Plan, although there is plainly no particular mention made of the property in the plan.2 (R.
27-36).

Plaintiffs assert that attachment 4 of their brief indicates that the 160 acres is a park
and designated as such under the general plan. (Appellant's brief at p. 15; R. 673-674).
However, the trial court correctly understood that this map was not adopted under the
general plan in 1996, and there is nothing in the plan to designate the 160 acres as park
property or any other dedicated public use of property. It was never designated officially as a
park. (See footnote 2 of the trial court's memorandum decision; R. 684).
2

Plaintiffs have tried to give some unique legal significance to the term "general plan
property." The term general plan property is simply property that is covered by the general
plan. With respect to this case, all property in the Ogden Valley, public or private, is
property that is covered by the general plan and can be referred to as "general plan property."
4

The issue tared bv i h< u lumn this case is whether Weber County has authority to
sell surplus property to Mr. Jones3 without, as plaintiffs' claim, notice and hearing. The
simple answer is yes.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242 authorizes a county to sell property and to establish the
manner for selling the property.
(1) The county may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, or otherwise
acquire and dispose of any real or personal property or any interest in such
property that it determines to be in the public interest.
(2) Any property interest acquired by the county shall be held in the name of
the county unless specifically otherwise provided by law.
(3) The county legislative body shall provide by ordinance, resolution, rule, or
regulation for the manner in which property shall be acquired, managed, and
disposed of.
Under the plain language of the statute, there is no express provision for notice or
public hearing |n mi i n j i ounn *s sale ot surplus property.
By authority of Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242, it is undisputed that the County did
enaa an ordinance to regulate the sale of surplus real property. The ordinance, 6-11-12 states
in pertinent part:
B. Real property may be disposed of by public auction, by listing with a
licensed realtor, by negotiation, by trade, by sealed bid, or otherwise as
disposition shall be approved by the County Commissioners prior to the

3

Plaintiffs state that Rulon Jones is a "prominent and controversial" citizen of Weber
County. Plaintiffs' statement of facts No. 5. The terms prominent and controversial are
labels created by Plaintiffs for their convenience and the implications they hope that the
labels might create. The labels have no basis in faa. The only controversy for Mr. Jones has
been created by Plaintiffs.

5

commencement of negotiations or other means of disposition. The County
Commissioners may refuse any or all offers or bids. (R. 331).
This ordinance does not provide for public notice or hearing prior to the sale of
surplus property. It is broad enough to give the County flexibility in administering the sale
of its surplus real property. When the agenda was posted for the County Commission's
public meeting held March 11,1997, it satisfied all notice requirements which were provided
by law at that time.
There are several ways under the ordinance that real property could be disposed of,
but there is no requirement for notice and hearing. Certainly, the county's aaions in case are
permitted under the ordinance. Mr. Jones gave a written offer to purchase the 160 acres to
the County. (R. 683). The County accepted the offer, and at a public meeting on March 11,
1997, the County Commission approved the sale. (R. 683). A quit claim deed was given
dated March 11, 1997, and recorded March 25, 1997. (R. 526). There simply was no
requirement for the county to have more public notice or hearing than was required for the
normal meeting held on March 11,1997.
Plaintiffs argue that statutes or constitutional law require a hearing in this case. With
respect to statutes, plaintiffs argue that Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-303 to 305 mandate two
notices and two hearings. Their argument fails under the plain language of the statute.
Plaintiffs call Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-305(2)(a) and (b) the "gateway" to
understanding these statutes. Indeed, it is the gateway that closes itself on plaintiffs. Section
305(2)(a) and (b) state as follows:

6

(2) (a) Before accepting, widening, removing, extending, relocating, narrowmg,
vacating, abandoning, changing the use, acquiring land for, or selling or leasing any
street or other public way, ground, place, property, or structure, the legislative body
shall submit the proposal to the planning commission for its review and
recommendations.
(b) If the legislative body approves any of the items contained in Subsection (a) if hall
amend the general plan.
Plaintiffs contend that every proposal to sell public ground must be submitted to the
planning t unirni sion for rei tvt and m oinmendations beiuti ihe sale. Then it i* presented
to the County Commission. If the County Commission were to approve a sale "it shall
amend the general plan."
7 his is n ! pi jp< n y thai uis ilt (in a led lu publn u»t It uaMwrnd b\ th< count

but

under the general plan, there was no specific dedication of this property for public use. In
fact, the title of 17-27-305, states that the section deals with the "Effea of the plan on public
uses." This sale ul property did not ihange the use ot die property under the general plan.
If the statute stopped at the end of subsection (a), plaintiffs' argument would be better.
However, the statute must be read as a whole, giving effea to the entire statute. "One of the
cardinal pimciplc s of staiuioi \ < oustru* tion is that 1 lit conns w ill It >ok in the rei >ri, >pnit,
and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subjea matter of the statute
dealing with the subjea." Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah
1989) quoting Masicbv. United States Smelting, 113 Utah 1 ), 1CS, I'M P M b U 6ib (1948).
Furthermore, "a statute should not be construed in a piecemeal fashion but as a
comprehensive whole." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037,1045 (Utah 1991).

7

The fatal flaw in plaintiffs' argument is that no amendment is required to the 1996
Ogden Valley general plan for the sale of the 160 acres of surplus property to Mr. Jones. A
mere change in ownership from Weber County to Rulon Jones did not require an
amendment to the general plan. The statute explicitly requires that if there is a sale of land
that would trigger an amendment to the general plan, then there are requirements to have the
planning commission make a recommendation about the sale and the amendment to the plan,
prior to sending it to the legislative body.
The Ogden Valley general plan says it "is intended to serve as a guide for community
decisions." (R. 27). The plan was "to identify the development and land use priorities of
Ogden Valley and establish the area's future direction relative to those issues." (R. 27). A
careful review of the Ogden Valley plan clearly shows that this sale of land triggered no
amendment to the plan.
As stated above, plaintiffs have attempted to identify the property as "park" property
that has been dedicated to a public use. Plaintiffs' Brief pp. 7-8. By characterizing the
property as the "Wolf Creek Park Property," plaintiffs imply a public use dedication of the
property. In reality, the 160 acres have never been operated, maintained or used as a park,
contrary to the claims of the plaintiffs and certainly is not designated park property under the
1996 Ogden Valley General Plan. Consequently, there is no statutory requirement for notice
and a hearing. Plaintiffs' interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-305(2) fails because it
omits critical parts of the statute and fails to interpret the statute in its entirety.
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Case Liv lines rim requin nninf ,nnl i heating beyond v\ hat wa^| nnicled m this case.
Plaintiffs now argue that Longley v. Leucadia Finanacial Corp., 2000 UT 69, 9 P.3d 762, is
persuasive that notice and hearing were required beyond what was done in this case.
In Longley, there was a specific statutory notice provision to give in itn c n i i he public.
Id. at 1115-16. This court found that where there was a specific statutory scheme for notice,
it must be followed

Id it 11 18, 2b

Unlike Longley, Weber County followed the applicable

statute and ordinance for the sale of surplus property. While plaintiffs argue a general plan
amendment was triggered by this sale, it was not, and the notice provisions they push are
inapplicable to the sale of this property.
They also cite Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 2001 Ut.App SS, : i P.3d 245, as
dispositive for failure to follow notice and hearing requirements. This case fails to apply to
Plaintiffs' claims. Hatch did not even mention a limitations period, an issue which is at the
heart of this case. It simply dealt with whether the town had complied with the enabling
statutes in enaaing a zoning ordinance and maps. The case had nothing to do with a general
plan. Genuinely, there is no case law that supports plaintiffs' position.
H. THE LIMITATION PERIOD OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-271001(2)(a) APPLIES IN THIS CASE TO BAR PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(2)(a)
does not apply to this case because the sale was nni untie nuclei ilir proihions of < liaptei 1727-1001. The statute states:
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with
the district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.
9

The law is settled that limitations periods are constitutional, and plaintiffs do not
attack the validity of the limitation period. See e.g.y Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,
977 P.2d 1201 (property owner's claim was barred by limitation period when property owner
claimed return of land mistakenly conveyed to county in condemnation proceedings.)
Plaintiffs' position is beyond reason. They are persons who claim to be harmed by a
decision that was made under the provisions of the chapter. The sale of this land most surely
is made under the provisions of the County Land Use and Management and the provisions of
the general plan enacted under the authority of the chapter. The plan discusses uses of
property and protections to keep the Ogden Valley area unique. The 160 acres are general
plan property that were owned by Weber County. It is absurd that appellants argue the Act
applies and then argue that it does not.
Weber County made the decision to sell this property with the specifics of the county
land management act in mind. Had there been any reason to amend the plan because of this
sale, more provisions of the act may have applied. The testimony of David Wilson, Deputy
Weber County Attorney, shows that consideration was given to the provisions of the county
land management act. (R. 604-611). Ironically, use of the land is the key issue in this case,
and that issue fits squarely within an act that carries the title County Land Use
Development and Management Act.
The purpose of a limitations period is to give finality to county land use and
management decisions. Appellants were clearly aware of the sale very early on. Ben Toone, a
plaintiff, said he knew of the sale about three days after it occurred, and he immediately
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began acting upon that knowledge. (R. 173, 177-178). However, he and the other plaintiffs
waited until nearly three years later to file this claim. The limitation period does apply in
this case to bar plaintiffs' claim.
HI. THE PUBLIC POLICY FOR SALE OF PUBLIC LANDS IS A
DETERMINATION FOR THE LEGISLATURE TO MAKE A N D NOT
THE COURT.
Plaintiffs assert the following public policy should be mandated by this court: any
citizen should be able at any time to challenge any sale of public property if the planning
commission and legislative body did not publicly hear and comment on a proposed sale of
public property. They want to take statutory protections offered in the law to owners of
property and elevate them to all citizens- This is not the law and Is a decision that should be
left to the legislature. The legislature at this time clearly allows for sale of surplus public
property without referral to the planning commission. The legislative body of the
jurisdiaion is involved in a sale, but not the planning commission. As this court knows, the
planning commission only has authority to make recommendations in any event.
The rule proposed by plaintiffs would be very cumbersome for all sales of public
property. There are parcels of surplus property scattered all over the state and the state
legislature has given the legislative body of the county the latitude to sell surplus property, if
it does not impaa the general plan. The local governmental entity must enaa a general plan,
but has latitude to specify location and extent of uses, open space, water issues, transportation
such as roads, public services, mountains, recreation, environmental considerations,
watersheds, rivers, forests, education, buildings, and many other considerations. See Utah
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Code Ann. § 17-27-302(2). Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-302(2)(h) states that the general plan may
contain "any other elements that the county considers appropriate." The county is to
consider its individual circumstances. Weber County has done just that. The Ogden Valley
General Plan is specific to the Ogden Valley and its circumstances, although this is only part
of Weber County. There are other considerations for the county on the west side of the
mountains and interacting with the communities and cities where the majority of the
population of Weber County is found. The legislature has given flexibility to governmental
entities to plan the use of the property within their jurisdictions. This is the policy the
legislature has made law at this time. There is also flexibility in selling public property. If
there is to be change in the law, it should come from the legislature.
Plaintiffs urge the court to mandate, in contravention to the legislature, a law
requiring two notices and two hearings for all sales of public land. The case they have
pounded on from the beginning, and continue to advocate in this brief to a lesser extent, is
W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755 (Utah App. 1990). They argue that the
reasoning of that case should apply to this case.
W. & G. dealt with Utah Code Ann. § 11-9-1 et. seq. which was then known as the
Neighborhood Development Act. As part of the statutory scheme, the RDA had the ability
to exercise eminent domain power if specific steps were followed. Because eminent domain
power could be exercised by the RDA against private landowners, the court's concern was
that "redevelopment is a serious action with the potential to harm individual property
rights." Id. at 761. Appellants would have this court place the rights of a citizen in public

12

property equal to those of a landowner. This is a decision that is left to the legislature, and
the legislature has not seen fit to make that leap.
Factually, this case does not involve any private property rights of individual
landowners. Plaintiffs do not own and have never owned the property that Weber Coimty
sold to Rulon Jones. This case does not involve the condemnation powers of the
governmental authority over the private property rights of the landowner. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs knew about the sale of the property within the 30-day period that gave them an
opportunity to challenge the sale. In spite of this, they waited nearly three years to formally
challenge the sale.
There are other critical legal distinctions also. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (3) (b)
limits a court's review to whether the action taken by the county was "arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal." The Land Use Development and Management A a contemplates that an action
could be illegal and provides the procedures to follow in that case and the remedy which is
available. Plaintiffs have not followed those procedures and are not entitled to that remedy.
Furthermore, the Land Use A a does not give condemnation power to the governmental
entity. The statute also does not distinguish between landowners and third parties who are
interested in the property on some other basis. Finally, the Neighborhood Development A a
and the Land Use and Management A a address distina and different subjea matters which
renders comparisons of the aas useless.
Plaintiffs also cite Stone v. Salt Lake City, 356 P.2d 631 (Utah 1960), in support of the
proposition that notice was required. Stone brought an aaion to enjoin Salt Lake from

13

selling two parcels of property, a parcel where the old public safety building and fire station
were and a golf course. The Court was dealing with a completely different statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-8, which required the city to create an ordinance to sell property. This
statute applied only to cities and not counties. There is no statute or ordinance in this case
that requires public notice and hearing above what was done. As stated above, this sale was
placed on the agenda and posted prior to the public meeting, which is all that was legally
required.
IV. THE RIGHT OF WAY ISSUE IS MOOT; THE RIGHT OF WAY IS
A PUBLIC RIGHT OF WAY
Weber County and Rulon Jones have made a judicial admission that the right of way
remains a public right of way. They accept that also as the order of the trial court. Plaintiffs
argue that this means the County and Mr. Jones had to give notice and hearing to sell the
property. As with all of their other arguments, this one is also misplaced. The admission
simply states that the parties recognize that the right of way is public. Furthermore, it is
obvious that it is only a right of way; there is an owner of that property who holds all legal
rights to the property, subjea to the right of way. There is no faaual or legal argument that
the right of way implies hearing and notice requirements for the sale of the property.
CONCLUSION
State law and county ordinance that apply to sale of surplus property were followed in
this case. The legislature recognizes the sale of surplus property and gives discretion to the
county to enaa ordinances for that purpose. Weber County enaaed an ordinance under
authority of Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242 and the law was followed.
14

The limitation period of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(2)(a) applies in this case and
bars the Appellant's claim. Without question, the decision of Weber County to sell this
property was made under the County Land Use Development and Management Act. The
decision to sell the property directly involved the management and land use of the county.
This was also property within the confines of the Ogden Valley General Plan and the uses
and management of that property.
Public policy does not merit the Court asserting itself into issues that have been
determined by the legislature. The legislature must determine whether every sale of public
property is required to have notice and hearing two times. The law currently recognizes that
is not always the case and gives flexibility to local governments in the sale of property.
Finally, the public right of way issue is moot, and both Weber County and Mr. Jones
have admitted that the right of way is public.
For the reasons stated above, the Court should affirm the decision of the trial court.
••2-M
DATED this p (
day of August, 2001.
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES

Micha
Attorney for Rulon Jones
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Memorandum Decision of the Trial Court

J':CONP

cnis'.cr i.v.ww:

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF'WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
Ben P. Toone, Kent D. Fuller, Robert J.
Fuller, Haynes R. Fuller, and Roger E.
Cannon,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
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Weber County, a political subdivision; the
Weber County Commission; Weber County
Commissioners Glen Burton, Ken Bischoff
and Camille Caine; Mark DeCaria, Weber
County Attorney; Rulon Jones, an individual,
and John and Jane Does 1-10

Case No. 990907314
Judge Michael D. Lyon

Defendants.

Plaintiffs move for summary judgment against the defendants, and the defendants file
cross-motions for summary judgment against the plaintiffs.1 The court grants summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND
In February 1997, Weber County sold to Rulon Jones ("Jones") 160 acres of undeveloped
real estate known as the Wolf Creek Park Property ("the property"), in an effort to extinguish a
budget shortfall. The property is west of the Powder Mountain Ski Resort in the Ogden Valley or

x

Defendant Rulon Jones filed a motion to dismiss, or a motion on the pleadings. He later
filed affidavits in support of his motion. Under rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if the
court considers "matters outside the pleadings," the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56.
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the environs of Huntsville, Eden, and Ogden Canyon of Weber County. Plaintiffs allege,
essentially, that the county violated certain statutes in selling the property and that the county
sold the property for inadequate compensation. They ask the court to void the transaction.
Defendants deny plaintiffs' allegations and seek dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.
FACTS SUPPORTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court should consider only those facts
"material to the applicable rule of law." Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983).
Accordingly, the following undisputed facts are material to and dispositive of the legal issues:
1.

Under the County Land Use Development and Management Act ("the act"), Utah

Code Ann. § 17-27-101, el seq.y the Weber County Commission adopted a General Plan ("the
plan") for the Ogden Valley with Resolution 46-96 on October 2, 1996.
2.

The resolution states that the plan shall serve to guide community decisions in

land use development policies and to encourage development in a responsible and deliberate
fashion, thereby protecting the natural beauty of the Ogden Valley, its natural resources, and its
slopes, ridge lines, view and entry corridors, wildlife habitat, and stream corridors.
3.

The county posted an agenda for a county commission meeting held on March 11,

1997, that included notice of the sale of the property to Jones. Following approval of the sale in
the county commission meeting, Weber County conveyed the property to Jones by quitclaim
deed on March 11, 1997. Jones recorded that deed on March 25, 1997.
4.

Under the quitclaim deed, the county also inadvertently conveyed a 30-foot public

right-of-way. The county and Jones made a judicial admission that the right-of-way was not
conveyed and remains with Weber County, as reflected in the original conveyance to the county.
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5.

The county did not give any other public notice or a hearing before selling the

property to Jones.
6.

The plan covers the property and permits a recreational use.

7.

Before the sale, the property had a recreational use, including hunting. Following

the sale, it has a recreational use,2 including hunting. Jones limits the hunting, however, to
persons who pay a fee.
8.

Plaintiffs did not commence this action until October 25, 1999, more than two and

one-half years after the county conveyed the property.
ISSUES
The motions for summary judgment present the following questions: (1) Are plaintiffs'
claims barred by the running of the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 17-271001(2)(a)? (2) Does state law or constitutional due process require the county to give public
notice and to hold a public hearing before selling the property to Jones?
ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment
"Summary judgment is warranted when 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Shattuck-Owen v.
Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, f9 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "Where the parties assert a
2

To their supplemental memorandum filed with the court on December 22, 2000,
plaintiffs attached a map prepared originally by the Weber County Planning Commission in 1967
and reprinted again by the planning commission in 1984. The legend of the map indicates
"Ogden Valley Study" and gives a "Physical Development Plan Interpretation" by using different
colors on the map. Under the legend, the map shows that the property was designated as a park.
When the county adopted the general plan in 1996, however, nothing under the plan designated
the property as a park or implemented this map to show its use restricted to a park.
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factual dispute, summary judgment is appropriate only when, viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion, the moving party is nevertheless entitled to
judgment." Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, 842 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1992); see Burton v.
Exam Or. Indus. & Gen. Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18,1J4 (citations omitted) ("Before
granting summary judgment, a court must, after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, find that no disputed issues of material fact exist and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). Summary judgment is not precluded "simply
whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted."
Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) (footnote omitted).
In this case, both parties are in agreement that there is no dispute as to any material facts,
and each side asks the court to rule as a matter of law on the issues presented in the memoranda.3
II. Statue of Limitations Under § 17-27-1001
Plaintiffs seek judicial review of the county's decision to sell the property to Jones under
the County Land Use Development and Management Act, found in Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-

3

There is a facial dispute of fact in plaintiffs' reply memorandum, p. 2, concerning the
recreational use of the property after the sale of the property. Plaintiffs argue that a change in
ownership intrinsically changes the use from one of unfettered public use to restricted public use.
Following a telephone conference with counsel on the record on December 19, 2000, the court
finds that there is no dispute that the property was used for recreational purposes before the sale
and continues to be used for recreational purposes after the sale. The court recalls both sides
taking that position during arguments on the motions for summary judgment as well. The court
concludes that plaintiffs' denial in his memorandum is really a legal argument, not a fundamental
factual dispute. Therefore, the court concludes as a matter of law, based on the purposes of the
act, that it is immaterial under the act whether it is a private recreational use or a public
recreational use, so long as the nature of the use conforms to the general plan. Accordingly, the
court entered finding no. 7 as an undisputed fact earlier in this decision.

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 990907314
Page 5
101„ etseq.4 Defendants assert that the statute of limitations in § 17-27-1001 limits this court's
review of county land use decisions to a period of 30 days after the county has made its decision.
The court agrees. The 30-day statute of limitations reads as follows:
(2)(a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise
of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with
the district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.

(3) The court shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
This limitation period promotes the public policy of making land use decisions final. The
statute of limitations forecloses the plaintiffs' claims, allowing Jones to rely on the county's
conveyance and proceed to use the property consistent with the pre-existing use or to seek a
change in land use by the procedure provided under the act, without fear of a challenge to the
sale.
To avoid the application of the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs offer the following

4

Although plaintiffs attempt to characterize their claims as seeking a declaration of "their
rights and other legal relations," to avail themselves of the lengthier statute of limitations found
in the Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq.f plaintiffs premise all their
other arguments under the County Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah Code
Ann. 17-27-101 etseq. Thus the statute of limitations under § 17-27-1001 governs the county's
decisions under that act. Furthermore, since the County Land Use Development Act is more
specific than the Declaratory Judgment Act, the court applies the more specific statute of
limitations. See Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (applying a two-year medical
malpractice statute of limitations in favor of a more general provision not specifically aimed at
medical malpractice claims. Moreover, plaintiffs may not re-characterize their claims in a
different fashion in order to avoid the application of this more specific statute and escape the
closure it gives to land use decisions. See DOIT, Inc. v. louche Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 842
(Utah 1996) (rejecting re-characterization of tort claim as a contract claim to avoid limitation
bar).
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arguments: 1) that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations; and 2) that state law and
constitutional due process required both the Weber County Planning Commission and the Weber
County Commissioners to give public notice and to hold a public hearing before selling the
property, and because the county failed to give the public notices and to hold the public
meetings, the statute of limitations was tolled.
Such defenses lack statutory or case law support, as explained below. In this case, the
county commission made a decision to convey the property to Jones on March 11, 1997. The
court rules as a matter of law that the statute of limitations began to run on that date, barring
plaintiffs' claims, brought more than two and one-half years after the county's decision to sell the
property.
III. DISCOVERY RULE
Plaintiffs urge the court to apply the discovery rule to extend the statute of limitations.
To invoke the discovery rule, plaintiffs must show that the county affirmatively concealed their
cause of action or that exceptional circumstances exist. See Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, ^ 10, 998
P.2d 262 (Utah 2000); Horn v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 102 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998). The county's concealment must be such as to preclude a reasonable plaintiff from
discovering the claim earlier and bringing it within the statutory period. See Warren v. Provo
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1992). Moreover, the concealment must involve a claim
of equitable estoppel or plaintiffs must show that, "under the circumstances, [they] acted in a
reasonable manner." Warren at 1129-30.
Plaintiffs provide no legal or factual basis upon which the court may toll the statute.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that Ben Toone learned of the conveyance within just a few days after it
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occurred, thereby refuting the notion that the county affirmatively concealed the transaction from
at least him. Further, Jones recorded the deed on March 25, 1997, after the county conveyed the
property on March 11, 1997, thus, arguably, imparting constructive notice of the conveyance on
March 25, 1997. In passing, the court recalls further, in other hearings, that there seemed to be no
dispute that newspapers reported the sale when it occurred, though this is not a specific finding
of the court.
Plaintiffs contend that Deputy County Attorney David Wilson had a responsibility at the
outset to protect the public's interest and challenge the sale. They assert that he instead "misled
Ben Toone by telling him that the sale was 'legal.'" This contention is untenable. First, it is
undisputed that Mr. Wilson did not conceal the conveyance, the event triggering the statute of
limitations. Second, nothing precluded Mr. Toone from obtaining a second legal opinion, which,
in hindsight, might have made the statute of limitations issue moot, assuming he acted timely.
Third, based on the analysis in this decision, the court believes that Mr. Wilson gave a sound
legal opinion.
The court finds no factual or legal foundation for tolling the statute of limitations for
"exceptional circumstances" either, certainly nothing that would outweigh the clear legislative
intent to provide a limited period for judicial review of local land use decisions or outweigh the
strong public policy behind the limitation period of lending predictability and finality to county
land management transactions.
Finally, none of the plaintiffs contends that he did not discover the sale until 30 days prior
to the filing of their complaint. Therefore, plaintiffs present no justification for waiting more
than two and one- half years to file their suit.
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IV. Sale of Property without Notice and Hearing
Plaintiffs argue that the county's failure to give statutory public notice and hearing before
making the sale to Jones tolled the limitation period. They further maintain that the county's
failure to do so implicated constitutional due process concerns. The court disagrees with both of
these premises. It is undisputed that the county did not provide any notices or hearings before the
public, except for posting an agenda referencing the county's consideration to sell the property to
Jones and an open county commission meeting on March 11,1997, in which the decision to sell
was made. The court agrees with the defendants that no other notices or public hearings were
required by state or local law. Further, the plaintiffs have no individual interest in the subject
property to implicate constitutional due process concerns.
The law will invalidate the sale of municipal real property only when a statute requires
notice and hearing and no notice or hearing was given, Bagwell v. Town of Brevard, 148 S.E.2d
635, 635 (N.C. 1966), or when constitutional due process has been violated, Lander v. Indus.
Comm n of Utah, 894 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah App. 1995).
A. Statutory Notice and Hearing Not Required
No Utah statute or county ordinance requires public notice and hearing concerning the
sale of surplus real property when the sale involves only a change in ownership and not a change
in land use.1 Under Utah law, a county may sell property and its county commissioners may
establish the manner of selling publically owned property:
(1) The county may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, or otherwise
acquire and dispose of any real or personal property or any interest in such
x

As used in this ruling, "surplus real property" means real property not used by the
county for any other publicly dedicated use, such as a park or street.
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property that it determines to be in the public interest.

(3) The county legislative body shall provide by ordinance, resolution, rule, or
regulation for the manner in which property shall be acquired, managed, and
disposed of.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242.2 This statute contains no express or implied statutory requirements
for notice or hearing to the public. Accordingly, the court can only infer that the legislature left
the decision of whether or not to give notice or a hearing before selling surplus real property to
the discretion of the county commission in making its ordinances.
Pursuant to the grant of authority under § 17-5-242, Weber County passed an ordinance
dealing with the selling of real property. It contains no express requirements of notice to and
hearing before the public before selling:
6-11-12 Disposal of Surplus Property.

B. Real property may be disposed of by public auction, by listing with a
licensed realtor, by negotiation, by trade, by sealed bid, or otherwise as
disposition shall be approved by the County Commissioners prior to the
commencement of negotiations or other means of disposition. The County
Commissioners may refuse any or all offers or bids.
Weber County Ordinance § 6-11-12. This ordinance permits the county commissioners to sell
real property through a variety of methods, approved by them. Some of these methods might
naturally involve public notice, but others might not. In any event, this ordinance does not
require a notice to and a hearing before the public before the county can sell real property.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs attempt to challenge the county's sale of the property to Jones by

Effective May 1, 2000, this section was renumbered to § 17-50-312.
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claiming that it failed to comply with notice and hearing provisions found in the County Land
Use Development and Management Act. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-101, et seq. Weber County
acknowledges that it did not give any notices or hearings under the act because they were not
necessary. Plaintiffs premise the application of the notice and hearing required under the act on a
change in ownership that occurred when the county conveyed the property to Jones. They begin
their argument with § 17-27-305:
(1) After the legislative body has adopted a general plan or any amendments to the
general plan, no street, park or other public way, ground, place, or space, no
publicly owned building or structure, and no public utility, where publicly or
privately owned, may be construed or authorized until and unless:
(a) it conforms to the plan; or
(b) it has been considered by the planning commission and, after receiving the
advice of the planning commission, approved by the legislative body as an
amendment to the general plan.
(2) (a) Before accepting, widening, removing, extending, relocating, narrowing,
vacating, abandoning, changing the use, acquiring land for, or selling or leasing any
street or other public way, ground, place, property, or structure, the legislative body
shall submit the proposal to the planning commission for its review and
recommendations.
(b) If the legislative body approves any of the items contained in Subsection (a), it shall
also amend the general plan.
Plaintiffs focus their argument in subsection (2). They contend that in subsection (2)(a),
the statute requires Weber County, "[b]efore . . . selling . . . any . . . public way, ground, place, or
property . . .," to "submit the proposal to the planning commission for its review and
recommendations." Further, as provided in subsection (2)(b), "[I]f the legislative body approves
any of the items contained in Subsection (a) [i.e., the sale to Jones], it shall also amend the plan."
Thus, argue plaintiffs, before selling the property to Jones, the proposed sale should have been
submitted to the planning commission for its review and recommendations to the county
commission. Then, if the county commission approved the sale, it should have also amended the
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plan before selling the property to Jones, requiring further public notice and hearing.
Plaintiffs maintain that this process would have provided two separate notices to the
public and two public hearings, one before the planning commission and a second one before the
county commission. Section 17-27-304 of the act provides that the "legislative body may amend
the general plan by following the procedures required by § 17-27-303," the procedure used
initially in adopting the plan. Section 17-27-303(l)(3) requires the planning commission to give
"reasonable notice of [a] public hearing at least 14 days before the date of [a] hearing." After that
hearing, the planning commission passes its recommendation on to the county commission.
Then, § 303(3)(a) requires the county commission to hold a hearing and to provide "reasonable
notice of the public hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing."
In summary, plaintiffs contend that before Weber County sold the property to Jones, state
law required the county to amend the general plan, requiring two 14-day notices to the public and
two public hearings. These hearings, assert plaintiffs, would have informed the public of and
would have permitted comment on the sale and its purchase price.
Undergirding plaintiffs' analysis, however, is the erroneous premise that a change in
ownership of surplus real property requires a change in the general plan. Plaintiffs defend this
premise by pointing selectively to language in subsection (2)(b) referencing the selling of the real
property, taking it out of the context of the whole section, and then connecting it to requirements
of public notices and hearings that do not apply. Plaintiffs' interpretation of § 305 is
unreasonable because it contravenes the legislative intent and the coherence of the section, read
as a whole, and of the act itself.
The rules of statutory construction must be followed to correctly understand § 305.
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Fundamentally, the court must construe this section to give effect to the legislature's underlying
intent:
[T]his Court's primary responsibility in construing legislative enactments is to
give effect to the Legislature's underlying intent. Generally, the best indication of
that intent is the statute's plain language. Thus, we will interpret a statute
according to its plain language, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused,
inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the statute. In
addition, statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof
relevant and meaningful, and . . . interpretations are to be avoided which render
some part of the provision nonsensical and absurd.
Perrine v. Kennecott Min. Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). While § 305 (2)(a) plainly
references selling ground, "statutory . . . interpretations are to be avoided which render some part
of the provision nonsensical or absurd." Id. Because any action under subsection (2)(a) requires a
plan amendment under subsection (2)(b), under plaintiffs' interpretation, the county must amend
the plan to reflect merely Jones' ownership of the property, although the use of the property
remains the same. The court disagrees this interpretation. Plaintiffs' interpretation ignores both
subsection (1) of § 305 and an important rule of statutory construction that "statutory enactments
are to be construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." Millett v. Clark Clinic
Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). Further, "a statute should not be construed in a piecemeal
fashion but as a comprehensive whole." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P. 2d 1037, 1045
(Utah 1991).
Subsection (1) states that no authorization of the ground may occur unless "(a) it
conforms to the plan; or (b) it has been considered by the planning commission and, after
receiving the advice of the planning commission, approved by the legislative body as an
amendment to the general plan." Read only by itself, without looking at the title to the section or
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the act as a whole, the language in § 305 of "until or unless: (a) it conforms to the plan" is
ambiguous. It is unclear in what way the pronoun "it" conforms to the plan.
Other rules of statutory construction assist with this ambiguity. Though not a part of the
statute, it is appropriate to consider a statute's title if the language of the statute creates an
ambiguity. Jenkins v. Percival 962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998). The title to § 305 reads "Effect of
the plan on public uses" (emphasis added). Another rule of construction is to look to the intent of
the act itself. See Evans v. Utah, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted) ("When we
interpret statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve.") In so doing, it becomes plain that the general plan
referenced in § 305 deals with property uses, not property ownership. Under § 17-27-103
(l)(h)(I), "General Plan" means a document that a county adopts to set forth general guidelines
for proposed future development of land within the county. Subpart (ii) of the same section states
that "General Plan" includes what is also commonly referred to as a "master plan."
The Weber County Commission adopted a general plan for the Ogden Valley with
Resolution 46-96 on October 2, 1996. The resolution states, in sum, that the plan shall serve as a
guide for community decisions in development and land use policies to encourage development
in a responsible and deliberate fashion, thereby protecting the natural beauty of the Ogden
Valley, its natural resources, and its slopes, ridge lines, view and entry corridors, wildlife habitat,
and stream corridors. Nowhere in the state act or in the county resolution is the general plan
concerned with ownership of property, which is the predicate of plaintiffs' interpretation of §
305. The general plan, under state law and county ordinance, deals only with uses ofproperty, as
defendants observe, and serves as a guide for development of real property consistent with the
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identified uses to ensure integrity and function of the plan, regardless of public or private
ownership.
Thus, going back to interpreting § 305(1 )(a), and more particularly the legislative intent
of the phrase "until or unless: (a) it conforms to the plan," it is clear to this court that this section
addresses land uses that conform or do not conform to the plan. Subsection (1), therefore,
authorizes the county commission to approve a disposition of the ground if the use conforms to
the plan; otherwise, the planning commission must consider the non-conforming use and the
county commission must approve the non-conforming use as a plan amendment.
Further, from a practical perspective, when the land use is not an issue before the county
commission but only the fair market value of the property is at issue (which is the real thrust of
plaintiffs' case), a review by the planning commission seems inane. Section 17-27-204 gives the
planning commission power to review and make or offer recommendations to the county
commission regarding land use and zoning changes, not to opine upon the property's fair market
value.
Finally, to render all parts of § 305 relevant and meaningful, as proper statutory
construction requires, this court must construe both subsections (1) and (2) of § 305 together in a
way that harmonizes their underlying intent. See Platts v. Parents Helping Hands, 947 P.2d 658,
662 (Utah 1997) (holding that courts must construe statutory language so as to render all parts
relevant, meaningful, and operative); Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, 854 P.2d 513,
518 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted) ("[I]f doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or
application of an act's provisions, the court should analyze the act in its entirety and 'harmonize
its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.'"); Jensen v. Intermountain
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Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted) ("[T]he meaning of a part
of an act should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act. Separate parts of an act should not
be construed in isolation from the rest of the act."). In doing so, the preceding analysis persuades
the court, and the court rules as a matter of law, that the selling of real property in § 305(2)(a)
means a selling that results in a land use change not in conformity to the plan. This
interpretation renders subsection (2)(b) relevant and meaningful to the whole section. Changes in
land use in the specific activities enumerated in subsection (2)(a), not in conformity with the
plan, necessitate an amendment to the general plan, consistent with subsection (l)(a) and (l)(b).
A change in ownership per se in subsection (2)(a) does not trigger a need for amendment to the
plan under (2)(b), as plaintiffs contend, because there is nothing to amend under the plan.
Plaintiffs' interpretation ignores the legislative intent of the entire section and of the act as a
whole, both of which deal clearly with land use, not ownership.
Concluding this point, the county's sale of the property to Jones did not change the
recreational use of the property under the plan; accordingly, the act did not require the county to
provide public notices and hearings before selling the property. In the future, however, if Jones
wishes to use the property for any purpose inconsistent with the plan, he will need to seek a land
use change, requiring notices to the public, hearings before the planning commission and the
county commission, and a plan amendment as required by § 305.
B. No Constitutional Requirement of Notice and Hearing
Plaintiffs assert that the citizens of Weber County have a constitutional right to notice and
hearing, which lie at the heart of procedural fairness, before the sale of public land to Jones, and
that the county's failure to give them notice and hearing deprived them of due process. They rely
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on W. & G Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755 (Utah App. 1990), an
eminent domain case involving the Neighborhood Development Act. Plaintiffs here argue that
the case stands for the proposition that the statute of limitations is not triggered when notice is
not given to the public. W. & G. is distinguishable from the case before this court and is
inapposite because, first, unlike the plaintiffs in W. & G., the plaintiffs in this case do not have a
specific, individual interest in the property. The plaintiffs in W. & G owned the property that
was being condemned; thus, any taking without strict compliance with actual notice would be an
unconstitutional taking without due process. Second, state law mandates precise statutory
requirements for taking property under the power of eminent domain in W. &G.\ however, in
this case no statutory requirements exist for notice and hearing before the sale of county surplus
real property. Moreover, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 960
P.2d 907, 210 (Utah App. 1998), expressly declined to extend W. & G to a process not affecting
individual property interests. Likewise, plaintiffs' reliance on Longley v. Leucadia Financial
Corp., 2000 Utah 69, 9 P.3d 762 (Utah 2000) before the Utah Supreme Court is misplaced.
Foremost, both decisions are based on strict compliance with statutory requirements for
published notice. No statutory notice requirements exist in the instant case. Furthermore, Chief
Justice Howe's concurring opinion addresses the constitutional issue of due process:
While Longley's constitutional right to due process may not have been violated,
the statute above mentioned clearly gives him the right to a published notice that
will inform the public of the diligence claimed and the reason for the request.
Thus it is a statutory right, not a constitutional right, which has been violated.
Id. at U 29, emphasis added.
In summary of this point, all of the cases that plaintiffs cite as authority for their position
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involve an express statutory requirement for notice, where none exists in this case. Plaintiffs have
no constitutional right to notice and hearing because they have no personal, vested interest in the
property sold to Jones.
CONCLUSION
The court is sympathetic with plaintiffs' position that it is desirable that sales of publicly
owned real property occur openly, through meaningful notices and hearings to the public, and
perhaps that is a matter that the legislature ought to review. However, this court may not
substitute its judgment for the legislature's and impose a requirement of notice and hearing
where none exits under the law. This court has the responsibility to interpret the law only and
then to follow it.
Under Utah law, the county has broad authority to determine how it will administer and
sell publicly owned surplus real property. The law imposes no express or implied statutory
requirement of notice and hearing before the sale of such property. As such, there was no
requirement of public notice and hearing connected with the county's sale of surplus real
property to Rulon Jones beyond the posting of the county commission's agenda, which included
the sale of the property, and the public meeting before the county commissioners in which the
sale of the property was discussed and approved. Further, the plaintiffs do not have any personal
vested interest in the property upon which they can base a constitutional due process claim of
right to notice and hearing.
The notice and hearing requirements that the plaintiffs contend the county violated deal
with notices and hearings that must occur before the county authorizes changes in land use that
do not conform the county's general plan. The general plan serves as an advisory guide for
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community decisions in real property development and land use policies. It is concerned only
with land use, to ensure the orderly and responsible development of real property, not with land
ownership, as plaintiffs assert. The county's sale of the property to Jones did not change the
recreational use of the property under the county's general plan. Accordingly, state law did not
require the county to provide public notice and hearing before selling the property.
Finally, plaintiffs' claims are barred by the running of the statutory period provided in the
act in which the plaintiffs seek judicial review of the county's conveyance of the property to
Jones. No factual or legal basis exists to toll the running of this limitation period.
Therefore, the court dismisses the plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. Mr. Burnett, in
consort with Mr. Houtz, may prepare appropriate findings of undisputed fact, conclusions of law,
and an order or judgment for the court's signature.
Dated this ffQ day of December, 2000.

Michael D. Lyon, Judge
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